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TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD* 
 
Gregory N. Mandel** 
 
 
I. CURRENT REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANTS AND 
ANIMALS 
 
A. The Coordinated Framework 
As the biotechnology industry developed in the early 1980s, it was 
recognized that regulation was necessary to protect human health and the 
environment from the potential deleterious effects of transgenic products. 
This recognition culminated in the promulgation of the federal government's 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology by the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1986.1 The Coordinated 
Framework instituted a “comprehensive federal regulatory policy for ... 
biotechnology research and products.”2 It specified that bioengineered 
products generally would be regulated under what was the then-existing 
statutory and regulatory structure.3 The foundation for this decision was a 
determination that the process of biotechnology was not inherently risky, and 
therefore, only the products of biotechnology, not the process itself, required 
                                                 
* © 2005 Gregory N. Mandel.  All rights reserved. 
 
**  Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School.  These materials are excerpted, with 
some modifications, from Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and 
Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004).  Please refer to the Gaps article for a fuller discussion of 
the issues addressed here. 
 
1 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 
26, 1986). 
 
2 Id. at 23,302. 
 
3 Id. at 23,302-08, 23,309, 23,313-14, 23,336. 
 
Vol. 4 [2006]     TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD                 22 
Gregory N. Mandel 
 
oversight. On this basis, the Coordinated Framework established that existing 
laws and regulations were sufficient to handle the products of 
biotechnology.4  This decision was based in part on a desire not to impose 
regulations that could hamper the development of a promising and fledgling 
industry.5 
As a result of the Coordinated Framework, genetically modified 
products are regulated by three administrative agencies: the FDA, the EPA, 
and the USDA. These three administrative agencies are involved in the 
regulation of the genetically modified products discussed in this paper: The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for food safety issues 
for transgenic crop and food-animal varieties, in addition to drug safety 
issues for modified pharmaceutical-producing plants or animals; the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) handles health and environmental 
effects of pest-protected plants; and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) regulates the effect of genetically modified plants on 
other plants and animals in both agricultural and nonagricultural 
environments.6 Because the Coordinated Framework would result in multiple 
agencies acting in closely related areas, two basic principles were delineated 
in order to guide regulatory policy. First, “[a]gencies should seek to adopt 
consistent definitions of those genetically engineered organisms subject to 
review to the extent permitted by their respective statutory authorities.”7 
                                                 
4 Id. at 23,302-03; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 25-26 (2000) [hereinafter NRC 2000 
REPORT]. 
 
5 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302-03. 
 
6 See Nat’l Research Council, Environmental Effects of Transgenic Plants 19 (2002) 
[hereinafter NRC 2002 Report]. 
 
7 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303. 
22 
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Second, the “agencies should utilize scientific reviews of comparable rigor.”8 
 With the Coordinated Framework in place, the regulation of biotechnology 
was left to the administrative agencies.   
 
B. The Food and Drug Administration 
The FDA is responsible for insuring that all food products on the 
market in the United States, other than meat and poultry, are safe. In 
furtherance of this goal, the FDA provides voluntary premarket consultations 
with food companies, seed companies, and plant developers regarding the 
safety of transgenic foods. 
The FDA’s statutory authority is the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (FFDCA), enacted in 1938.9 No statutory provisions or FDA 
regulations expressly cover genetically modified foods. Pursuant to FDA 
regulations, plants modified through modern rDNA techniques are not treated 
any differently from conventionally modified plants.10 
Section 402(a)(1) of the FFDCA authorizes the FDA to regulate 
“adulterated foods,” which is food that “bears or contains any poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.”11 In addition, 
section 409 of the FFDCA provides for the regulation of “food additives,” 
which are substances that are intended for use in food, that may reasonably 
be expected to become a component of food, or that otherwise may affect the 
                                                 
8 Id. 
  
9 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2003). 
  
10 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 
(May 29, 1992). 
 
11 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1994). “Food” is defined as “(1) articles used for food or drink 
for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any 
such article.” Id. § 321(f). This includes human food, animal food, pet food, and 
substances migrating to food from food-contact articles. 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(m) (2003). 
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characteristics of food.12 A food additive must be approved by the FDA prior 
to being used in a food product. 13 Manufacturers, however, do not need 
approval for a food additive if such substance is generally recognized as safe 
(GRAS) by experts.14 
Thus, both the inserted gene of a transgenic plant and the product that 
it expresses are food additives, unless they are GRAS.15 With respect to 
genetically modified foods, the FDA has determined that “[i]n most cases, 
the substances expected to become components of food as a result of genetic 
modification of a plant will be the same as or substantially similar to 
substances commonly found in food, such as proteins, fats and oils, and 
carbohydrates,” and therefore will be GRAS.16 
The food additive manufacturer, not the FDA, determines whether a 
food additive is GRAS.17 A manufacturer does not need to report to the FDA 
that it has made a GRAS determination, but it may do so and may receive 
from the FDA an affirmation that the particular substance is GRAS.18 Thus, 
the FDA’s regulatory requirements with respect to genetically modified food 
are primarily voluntary. This decision was explicitly made by the FDA based 
on its determination that “[a]ny genetic modification technique has the 
                                                 
12 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348 (1994). 
 
13 Id. § 348. 
14 Id. § 321(s). 
 
15 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990. 
 
16 Id. at 22,985. The primary exceptions, where foods would require special review, 
would be where the gene transfer produces unexpected genetic results, may cause allergic 
reactions, significantly increases the level of toxicants, or changes the nutrient 
composition of the food. Id. at 22,993 fig.1. 
 
17 Id. at 22,989. 
 
18 21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2003). Such a determination will protect the product from 
enforcement actions. Id.  
 
24 
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potential to alter the composition of food in a manner relevant to food safety, 
although, based on experience, the likelihood of a safety hazard is typically 
very low.”19 In 1995, the FDA conducted a safety review of the first 
genetically modified food product to be commercialized, the Flavr Savr 
tomato.20 This review was conducted at the request of the manufacturer, who 
was attempting to build public confidence.21 Since that time, the FDA has not 
conducted a safety review of any of the scores of other genetically modified 
food products that have been commercialized; however, the FDA believes 
that manufacturers have voluntarily consulted with it regarding each of these 
products.22  
The FDA does not require that genetically modified foods be labeled 
as such. The basis for this determination is the FDA’s conclusion that 
                                                 
19 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,986. 
A challenge to the FDA’s decision not to regulate genetically modified food differently 
from conventional food was dismissed. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 
2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000). 
On January 18, 2001, the FDA published proposed revised regulations for genetically 
engineered food. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 
(Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592). These regulations would 
require manufacturers and importers to provide the FDA with premarket notification of 
their intent to market genetically modified foods that have not been subject to a previous 
premarket notification. Id. at 4707. These proposals, promulgated days before President 
George W. Bush took office, have not been finalized or acted upon since that time. 
 
20 See John Henkel, Genetic Engineering: Fast Forwarding to Future Foods, FDA 
Consumer, April 1995, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/CONSUMER/geneng.html. 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4708; NRC 2000 
Report, supra note 2, at 29; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., FDA 
To Strengthen Premarket Review of Bioengineered Foods (May 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00726.html.  The FDA has been consulted on 
more than fifty bioengineered plants. Office of Food Additive Safety, FDA List of 
Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods, http://www. 
cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/biocon.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).  The FDA has not required 
any of the transgenic plants, or their expression products, to be reviewed as food 
additives. NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 29. 
 
 
Vol. 4 [2006]     TOWARD RATIONAL REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD                 26 
Gregory N. Mandel 
 
genetically modified products do not differ materially from, or create greater 
safety concerns than, their conventional counterparts.23 To the extent that 
there are significant safety concerns or usage issues, such as substantial 
changes in composition or nutritive value, the FDA requires labeling.24 
The FDA explicitly has waived its regulatory authority over 
genetically modified pest-protected plants, so long as the plants have not also 
been modified to express other nonpesticidal proteins.25 These plants are 
regulated by the EPA as pesticides, and are discussed below.26 
The FDA asserts regulatory authority over genetically modified fish 
and other animals pursuant to the “new animal drug” provisions of the 
FFDCA.27 These provisions allow the FDA to evaluate the new animal 
drug’s safety with “reference to the health of man or animal,”28 which is 
interpreted to include environmental effects that impact the health of humans 
                                                 
23 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,991. 
 
24 Id. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000), the 
court upheld the FDA’s decision not to require labeling based on consumer interest. Id. at 
181. Proponents of genetically modified food labeling point out an apparent inconsistency 
in FDA regulations, as the FDA does require labeling based on processing differences 
and consumer interest in certain other areas. Examples include labeling requirements for 
juice made from concentrate and for food that has been frozen. See 21 C.F.R. § 102.33 
(2003) (labeling requirements for juice from concentrate); 9 C.F.R. § 381.129 (2003) 
(labeling requirements for previously frozen poultry). 
 
25 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,005. 
 
26 See infra Part I.C; Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Residues Derived Through Conventional Breeding 
from Sexually Compatible Plants of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-
Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,830, 37,835 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
174); see also Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772, 
37,775 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (EPA regulations for 
pest-protected plants). 
 
27 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
 
28 21 U.S.C. § 321(u) (1994). 
26 
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or animals other than those intended to receive the new drug.29      
The FDA has regulatory authority over pharmaceuticals grown in 
genetically modified plants that are intended for use in humans pursuant to 
the Public Health Service Act30 and the FFDCA. A full discussion of FDA 
regulations governing the approval of pharmaceuticals for human use is 
beyond the scope of these comments. It is sufficient to note that FDA 
regulations are similar to those governing transgenic plants used for food. In 
both cases, the FDA regulates the use of plants that might express an 
allergenic or toxic compound in the pharmaceutical, and protects against the 
introduction of nonfood material into food or feed.31 The FDA regulations 
governing human drugs, biologics, and animal drugs do not specifically 
address biotechnology.32 The USDA shares regulatory authority over the 
growth of the genetically engineered pharmaceutical-producing plants, as 
discussed below.33 
C. The Environmental Protection Agency 
The EPA regulates genetically modified products through its 
authority to regulate pesticide use and pesticide residue in food products. All 
pesticides must be registered with the EPA prior to their distribution, sale, or 
use, pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and the Rodenticide Act 
                                                 
 
29 Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. I: Growth-
Enhanced Salmon 14 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. I: Growth-Enhanced Salmon], 
available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_ study2.pdf. 
 
30 42 U.S.C. § 262-262(a) (2003). 
 
31 See Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., FDA Guidance for Industry: Drugs, Biologics, and 
Medical Devices Derived from Bioengineered Plants for Use in Humans and Animals 
(Draft Guidance) (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/bioplant.htm. 
 
32 See Nat’l Research Council, Animal Biotechnology: Science-Based Concerns 164 
(2002) [hereinafter Animal Biotechnology].  
 
33 See infra Part I.D. 
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(FIFRA) of 1947.34 “Pesticide” is defined under FIFRA to include any 
substance “intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any 
pest.”35 To register a pesticide, one must demonstrate that the pesticide will 
not cause “unreasonable adverse risk to man or to the environment.”36 The 
EPA has authority to exempt pesticides from registration requirements if it 
determines them “to be of a character which is unnecessary to be subject to 
[FIFRA] in order to carry out the purposes of [FIFRA].”37 
FIFRA was enacted to regulate chemical substances, not 
biotechnological products (it was enacted prior to Watson and Crick’s 
discovery of the DNA molecule). Based on FIFRA’s statutory definition of 
“pesticide,” however, the EPA regulates the genetic material inserted into 
transgenic plants to express pesticidal products, as well as the expression 
                                                 
 
34 7 U.S.C. § 136-136(a) (1994). The EPA has the authority to regulate chemical 
substances under the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994), but has determined that 
transgenic plants are not chemical substances. Statement of Policy, Microbial Products 
Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,324 (June 26, 1986). The EPA regulates 
genetically modified microorganisms pursuant to TSCA, defining microorganisms as 
chemical substances. 40 C.F.R. § 725.8(c)(1) (2001). 
 
35 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1994). 
 
36 Id. § 136(a)(c)(8). 
 
37 Id. § 136(w)(b). The EPA will exempt pesticides where there is “a low probability of 
risk to the environment, and [it] is not likely to cause unreasonable adverse effects [on] 
the environment even in the absence of regulatory oversight under FIFRA.” Regulations 
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated 
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,773 (July 19, 2001) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174). The EPA has exempted pest-protected plants that are 
derived through conventional breeding processes from pesticide registration 
requirements. Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Residues Derived Through Conventional Breeding from 
Sexually Compatible Plants of Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-
Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,835 (July 19, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 174). The 
EPA also has used this exemption process to exempt from the FFDCA tolerance 
requirements “residues of nucleic acids that are part of a plant-incorporated protectant.” 
Exemption from the Requirement for a Tolerance Under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act for Residues of Nucleic Acids That are Part of Plant-Incorporated 
28 
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products themselves, as pesticides.38 Thus, manufacturers of transgenic pest-
protected plants must receive registration of the plants from the EPA prior to 
commercialization. Certain congressional members and professional societies 
have contended that the EPA does not have authority to regulate transgenic 
pest-protected plants as pesticides under FIFRA, but the regulations have not 
been challenged in court.39 
In 1988, just prior to the widespread development of genetically 
engineered pest-protected plants, the EPA exempted plants and 
microorganisms with pesticidal properties from the requirements of FIFRA.40 
This exemption was intended for plants, such as chrysanthemums, that are 
naturally pest-protected.41 Due to these regulations, the EPA does not 
regulate any plants themselves, including genetically modified ones.42 As 
discussed above, the EPA does regulate the inserted genetic material and the 
products it expresses. 
The EPA is responsible for regulating both the environmental and 
human health impacts of plants genetically modified to produce their own 
                                                                                                                         
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,817, 37,820 (July 19, 2001). 
 
38 Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for  
Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,772-73. 
 
39 NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 38. In addition, they have raised concerns that the 
EPA regulation lacks “formal cost-benefit analysis,” that it “could damage the 
[technological] progress ... by overburdening small biotechnology companies and public 
breeding programs,” and could undermine “[public] confidence in the food supply.” Id. 
Regarding the first issue, the lack of formal cost-benefit analysis, it is worth noting that 
the registration decision takes into account the “economic, social, and environmental 
costs and benefits” of the pesticide. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994). 
 
40 40 C.F.R. § 152.20a (2001); see Pesticide Registration Procedures, Pesticide Data 
Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,952, 15,975 (May 4, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 152-53, 156, 158, 162).  
 
41 NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 150. 
 
42 See 40 C.F.R. § 152.20a (2001); Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 
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pesticides as the FDA has ceded regulatory authority over pest-protected 
plants to the EPA.43 Where use of a pesticide will result in any residue being 
left on food, the pesticide is subject to regulation by the EPA pursuant to the 
FFDCA. In these instances, the EPA establishes “tolerance” levels for the 
allowable amount of pesticide residue that can be left on food products.44 
Currently, all FIFRA-registered pest-protected plants are exempt from 
tolerance level requirements because tests of these transgenic plants have not 
revealed a human health risk.45 
The EPA does not regulate genetically engineered plants other than 
those modified to contain pesticides,46 and it does not regulate the 
environmental impacts or potential impacts of genetically engineered 
animals. 
D. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
The USDA is responsible for protecting and promoting American 
agriculture. Based on the principle that genetically modified plants could 
pose a risk to agricultural crops, the USDA oversees the agricultural safety of 
the movement, importation, and field testing of transgenic plants. 
In order to grow transgenic plants outside of a laboratory, approval 
must be obtained from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) of the USDA. APHIS’s authority to regulate genetically modified 
plants stems from the Plant Protection Act (PPA).47 The PPA was enacted in 
                                                                                                                         
Fed. Reg. at 37,774.  
 
43 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994). The registration process requires submission of 
information on the potential beneficial or adverse effects of the pesticide on human health 
and the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2) (1994). 
 
44 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994). 
45 See 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2001). 
 
46 For example, it does not regulate herbicide-resistant or disease-resistant plants. 
 
47 Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2003). 
30 
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2000, and thus, at first glance, appears to deviate from the trend of regulating 
biotechnology under ancient statutes. The PPA, however, essentially 
consolidated authority from two previous statutes that APHIS had used to 
regulate genetically modified organisms: the Federal Plant Pest Act 
(FPPA),48 enacted in 1957, and the Federal Plant Quarantine Act (PQA),49 
enacted in 1912. Both the FPPA and PQA were originally enacted to regulate 
the introduction of non-indigenous plant species.50 APHIS regulations 
governing genetically modified plants under the PPA are simply those 
established pursuant to the FPPA and the PQA.51 No modification to 
APHIS’s regulation of biotechnology products has been made pursuant to the 
PPA.52 
In accordance with the PPA, APHIS has primary regulatory authority 
for all genetically modified plants except pest-protected ones.53 As APHIS is 
supposed to carry out its mandate while not impeding the growth of the 
                                                 
 
48 7 U.S.C. § 150aa-jj (1994). 
 
49 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 166-167 (1994). 
 
50 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,342-43 (June 26, 1986). 
51 See Plant Protection Act, Revisions to Authority Citations, 66 Fed. Reg. 21,049 (Apr. 
27, 2001) (revising the genetically modified plant regulations to change authority 
citations to the PPA without substantively changing the regulations); Michael R. Taylor 
& Jody S. Tick, Post-Market Oversight of Biotech Foods: Is the System Prepared? 25 
(2003). The PPA was enacted as part of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, 
pursuant to H.R. 2559. There was no Senate or House debate on the PPA portions of H.R. 
2559, and there is little legislative history to indicate what Congress’ intent was with 
respect to genetically modified plants when it passed the PPA. 
 
52 Where APHIS has promulgated new regulations subsequent to the enactment of the 
PPA, such regulations have not differed “from what [APHIS] would have proposed under 
the authority of th[e] applicable provisions of law that were repealed by the Plant 
Protection Act.” Plant Pest Regulations, Update of Current Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 
51,340 (Oct. 9, 2001); see Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 25. 
 
53 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 101. 
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biotechnology industry,54 critics have contended that an agency charged with 
promoting agriculture (including the biotechnology industry), “may not be 
able to objectively assess the safety of new products of agricultural 
biotechnology.”55 
Under the PPA, anyone seeking to introduce (i.e., import, transport 
interstate, or release into the environment)56 a regulated article must receive 
authorization from APHIS.57 “Regulated article” includes, 
[a]ny organism which has been altered or 
produced through genetic engineering, if the 
donor organism, recipient organism, or vector 
or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa 
designated in § 340.2 [a list of known plant 
pests] and meets the definition of plant pest, 
or is an unclassified organism and/or an 
organism whose classification is unknown, or 
any product which contains such an organism, 
or any other organism or product altered or 
produced through genetic engineering which 
[APHIS] determines is a plant pest....58 
 
A “plant pest” includes a wide variety of organisms “which can 
directly or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in or to any plants or 
parts thereof ....”59 This definition is very broad; any species that interacts 
                                                 
 
54 Id. at 49. 
 
55 Id. at 19. 
 
56 “Environmental release” is the use of a regulated article outside the physical constraints 
of a laboratory, contained greenhouse, or other contained structure. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 
(2003). 
 
57 Id. § 340. 
 
58 Id. § 340.1. Note that this definition is explicitly based on the organism’s having been 
developed through genetic engineering; i.e., it regulates based on the process by which 
the article was produced, not based on the product. One result of the taxonomic list 
restriction is that vertebrates cannot be considered plant pests. Id. § 340.2. 
 
32 
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ecologically with a plant could likely be considered to indirectly injure or 
damage it.60 
Prior to conducting a field trial of a new transgenic plant, a developer 
must perform a risk evaluation on the plant to determine whether the plant 
may be a plant pest. No consideration of any other risks, such as other human 
health or environmental risks, must be evaluated prior to the field test.61  
Authorization from APHIS can come via a notification or permitting 
process, each of which is aimed at ensuring that the transgenic organisms are 
grown and handled in a manner to prevent their escape into the environment. 
For most genetically modified plants, under certain conditions, simple 
notification of APHIS prior to release (without the requirement of receiving a 
permit) is sufficient.62 Nearly 99% of all field tests, importations, and 
interstate movement of genetically engineered plants take place under the 
notification system.63 
Permits are required for the movement, importation, and field testing 
of transgenic plants that do not qualify for notification and for plants denied 
                                                                                                                         
59 Id. § 340.1. 
 
60 Id. 
 
61 Id. § 340. 
62 Id. § 340.3. The notification process applies to a specified list of plants and 
characteristics. Requirements include: confinement; that the plant not be listed as a 
noxious weed or considered a weed in the area of release; that the inserted gene be stably 
integrated; that the function of the inserted gene be known; that the inserted gene’s 
expression not result in plant disease; that the inserted gene be derived from human or 
animal viral pathogens; and that the inserted gene does not cause the production of an 
infectious entity, encode for substances likely to be toxic to nontarget species or to feed 
on the plant, or encode for products intended for pharmaceutical use. NRC 2002 Report, 
supra note 6, at 108-09. 
The applicant must notify APHIS of its intent to release a regulated article. 
APHIS staff reviews the notification for qualification and completeness, and then sends a 
recommendation to state officials for concurrence. The entire process must be completed 
in ten days for interstate movement, and thirty days otherwise. 7 C.F.R. § 304.3 (2001). 
63 Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. III: 
Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean 4 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant 
Soybean], available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study4.pdf. 
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notification.64 APHIS uses the permitting process to evaluate potential plant 
pest risk and to require prevention measures to reduce risk.65 The primary 
emphasis of the permitting process is confinement.66 
An applicant can petition APHIS to determine that a certain 
genetically modified plant is not a plant pest (essentially that the regulated 
article is free from the risks outlined above), and therefore should be given 
“nonregulated status.”67 Plants granted nonregulated status, as well as their 
progeny, are no longer subject to any APHIS oversight—they may be freely 
planted, transported, and sold.68 This process is the sole manner in which 
transgenic plants can be commercialized, and the primary, though not sole, 
route through which the products of transgenic plants can be commercialized 
(e.g., sale of an industrial protein derived from a plant).69 
APHIS regulates transgenic pharmaceutical-producing plants 
pursuant to the same authority under which it regulates other transgenic 
plants, such as “regulated articles” under the PPA.70 Thus, applicants must 
acquire a permit prior to the field test of transgenic pharmaceutical-producing 
plants, as such plants are specifically excluded from the notification 
                                                 
 
64 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 110. 
 
65 Id. 
 
66 Id. 
 
67 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2001). 
 
68 Id. Prior to receiving nonregulated status, APHIS must conduct an Environmental 
Assessment pursuant to NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2002). 
 
69 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 111. “[C]ommercial products have also been 
created from regulated transgenic [plants].” Id. at 120. APHIS has deregulated many 
genetically modified crops. APHIS maintains a list of the deregulated plants, as well as 
pending deregulation petitions.  APHIS, Petitions of Nonregulated Status granted or 
pending by Aphis, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/not_reg.html (last visited Sept. 18, 
2005). 
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process.71 Various measures must then be taken to confine the transgenic 
plants to the field site during the period of release, and to prevent the plants 
or their offspring from persisting in the environment subsequently.72 
With respect to biotechnology developments beyond plants, the Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the USDA is responsible for the 
safety of food products prepared from domestic livestock and poultry.73 The 
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act 
(PPIA) require FSIS to inspect cattle, sheep, swine, goats, equines, poultry, 
and food products prepared from them, which are intended for use as human 
food.74 Pursuant to these acts, the FSIS has regulatory authority over 
genetically modified domestic livestock and poultry. 
APHIS also has regulatory authority over the release of insects for 
pest management,75 and presumably would regulate the release of transgenic 
insects in the same manner. No agency regulates research and 
commercialization of transgenic insects other than for their intentional 
release, and no guidelines exist that govern their containment or the potential 
                                                                                                                         
70 7 C.F.R. § 340 (2001). 
 
71 Id. § 340.4. 
 
72 Id. § 340.3. Earlier regulations required that the pharmaceutical-producing plants be 
isolated by a 1320 foot buffer from other plants in order to prevent cross-pollination, a 
distance twice that used to assure purity of their seeds.  Andrew Pollack, New Ventures 
Aim to Put Farms in Vanguard of Farm Production, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2000, at A1; 7 
C.F.R. § 201.76 (2003); Regulations proposed by APHIS would increase the buffer zone 
to one-half to one mile depending on certain factors. Field Testing of Plants Engineered 
To Produce Pharmaceutical and Industrial Compounds, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,337, 11,338 
(Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340). 
Other protective techniques are being developed. These include implanting a 
gene to turn the pharmaceutical-producing plant a different color and harvesting the 
pharmaceutical-producing plants before sexual maturity. Pollack, supra, at A1. 
 
73 See 9 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, 300.2, 300.3 (2003) (establishing the FSIS within the USDA); 
21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 601, 1031 (2003) (granting the FSIS administrator the authority to 
regulate the safety of domestic livestock, poultry, and poultry products). 
74 21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 601, 1031 (2003). 
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ecological risks posed by their release.76 
As evidenced by the preceding analysis, the statutory structure under 
which biotechnological products are regulated in the United States is based 
on legislation enacted decades ago, long before transgenic products were 
scientifically conceivable. As a result of dated statutes, and decisions made in 
the Coordinated Framework and thereafter, the regulations governing 
genetically modified products have been developed in a piecemeal, 
haphazard manner. Genetically modified plants and animals are now 
governed by as many as twelve different statutes and five different agencies 
or services.77 
                                                                                                                         
75 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2003); 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.3, 2.22, 2.80(a)(51) (2003). 
 
76 Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 21, 88-89, 114. For a discussion of how 
certain existing statutes could be applied to transgenic insects, see The Pew Initiative on 
Food & Biotechnology, Bugs in the System?: Issues in the Science and Regulation of 
Genetically Modified Insects (2004) [hereinafter Bugs in the System], available at 
http://pewagbiotech.org/research/bugs/bugs.pdf. 
 
77 See Table 1 infra Part I.D. 
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Table 1. Regulatory Authority over Transgenic Plants and Animals.78 
  
USE 
 
STATUTE 
 
AGENCY 
 
Food and food additives 
Meat, poultry, egg products 
Pesticide residues 
 
FFDCA 
FMIA,79 PPIA,80 EPIA81 
FFDCA 
 
FDA 
FSIS 
EPA 
 
Production of pharmaceuticals 
Human drugs       
Human biologics    
Animal drugs     
Animal biologics   
 
 
FFDCA 
PHS Act,82 FFDCA 
FFDCA 
AQL,83 VSTA84 
 
 
FDA 
FDA 
FDA 
APHIS 
 
Production of pesticidal 
substances in plants 
 
FIFRA 
PPA 
 
EPA 
APHIS 
 
Production of plant herbicide-
tolerance 
Herbicide usage on plants   
 
PPA 
FIFRA 
 
APHIS 
EPA 
 
Biocontrol of plants 
 
PPA 
FIFRA 
 
APHIS 
EPA 
 
Biocontrol of plant pests 
 
PPA 
FIFRA 
 
APHIS 
EPA 
 
Biomedical research on animals 
 
AWA85 
HREA86 
 
APHIS 
NIH87 
                                                 
78 Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 162-64; Council on Envtl. Quality & Office 
of Sci. & Tech. Policy, CEQ and OSTP Assessment: Case Studies of Environmental 
Regulations for Biotechnology 6 (2001) [hereinafter CEQ and OSTP Assessment], 
available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study1.pdf. This Table lists the common 
uses of genetically modified plant and animal products, the statutes under which they are 
regulated, and the regulating agency under each statute. A careful reader will note that 
this Table lists only eleven statutes. As discussed elsewhere in these comments, the 
AHPA (enacted in 2002) may represent the twelfth statutory authority concerning 
genetically modified plants and animals. See infra note 101. 
 
79 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-691 (2003). 
 
80 Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (2003). 
 
81 Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1056 (2003). 
 
82 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2003). 
 
83 Animal Quarantine Laws, 21 U.S.C. §§ 101-135 (2003). 
 
84 Virus, Serums, and Toxins Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2003). 
 
85 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2003). 
 
86 Health Research Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300gg-92 (2003). 
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The multiplicity of statutes and agencies regulating biotechnology has 
created confusion among the regulated industry and the public, reduced 
clarity regarding scientific standards and requirements, and has retarded the 
efficiency of biotechnology development and regulation. Not surprisingly, 
this fractured approach to regulation has led to numerous problems. These 
regulatory problems are discussed and categorized in the following section. 
 
II. REGULATORY GAPS, INCONSISTENCIES, INEXPERIENCE, AND 
OVERLAPS 
 
The statutory and regulatory regime for genetically modified products 
described in the preceding section only partially reveals how these products 
are actually regulated in practice. The quality of transgenic product 
regulation is affected by issues of agency financial and personnel resources, 
agency priorities, agency decision making structures, the quality of and 
reliance on in-house and third-party research, agency capture, political 
pressure, in addition to other factors. This section analyzes deficiencies that 
exist in the regulation of genetically modified products. 
In order to better understand these deficiencies, and to work towards 
their cure, it is useful to categorize them. The following four categories cover 
most of the regulatory problems concerning transgenic products identified 
here: gaps in regulation or regulatory authority; overlaps in regulation or 
regulatory authority; inconsistencies among agencies in their regulation of 
similarly situated or identical products; and instances of agencies acting 
outside their areas of expertise. 
Gaps are a problem because of the potential for harm to human health 
or the environment. Overlaps cause a dead-weight loss on multiple fronts: for 
the regulated industry which has to fulfill duplicative requirements, for 
                                                                                                                         
87 National Institutes of Health. 
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government and the taxpayers who pay beyond the necessary cost of 
regulation, and for society for whom the development and commercialization 
of transgenic products is inefficiently delayed.  Inconsistencies are not only 
irrational, but they also create a dead-weight loss for industry trying to 
comply with the regulations and they may delay the development of valuable 
products. Lastly, instances of agencies acting outside their areas of expertise 
are inefficient and unreasonably increase the risk posed to society by 
genetically modified products. Each of these categories of deficiencies is 
discussed in turn. 
A. Regulatory Gaps 
1. Gaps in Environmental Review 
The most striking incidence of regulatory gaps with regard to 
genetically modified products is the lack of EPA involvement in the review 
and approval of numerous products that could have a significant impact on 
the environment. The most significant risks posed by the introduction of 
genetically modified fish, for instance, are likely environmental. The EPA, 
however, has determined that it does not have regulatory authority over these 
products. The EPA also has no role in the approval or field-testing and 
widespread planting of genetically modified plants other than those modified 
to be pest-protected. Thus, the EPA is not evaluating the potential impact of 
transgenic pharmaceutical-producing, industrial compound-producing, 
herbicide-tolerant, drought-tolerant, salinity-tolerant, virus-resistant, 
temperature-tolerant, or disease-resistant plants on the environment. 
Since the majority of types of genetically modified plants are not 
subject to environmental evaluation by the agency charged with protecting 
the nation’s environment, there is the potential for unsafe products 
permeating the market. APHIS does not conduct environmental assessments 
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of transgenic plants submitted through the notification process,88 which is 
currently the dominant route for the field-testing of new genetically 
engineered plants.89 
Perhaps most troubling is the insufficiency of the environmental 
testing that APHIS engages. The National Research Council recently 
criticized certain APHIS environmental risk assessments for “lack[ing] 
scientific rigor, balance, and transparency,”90 for containing an analysis that 
was “weak and inconsistent,”91 for failing to evaluate potential impacts on 
nontarget organisms, for failing to consider the interactions between multiple 
transgenic traits, and for failing to utilize all available scientific data and 
information.92 APHIS also has been criticized for “relying too heavily on 
existing scientific literature rather than requiring applicants [for notification] 
to develop new experimental data” relevant to the risks posed by the 
pertinent genetically modified plants being reviewed.93 The EPA, with 
numerous experts trained in and routinely performing environmental risk 
                                                 
88 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 123. APHIS assumes genetically modified plants 
released into the environment pursuant to the notification process to be environmentally 
safe based upon the notification criteria and efforts required to minimize the chance of 
escape in the field. Id. 
 
89 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 
90 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 148. 
 
91 Id. at 149. 
 
92 Id. at 148-53, 160-66, 235. These criticisms were based on concerns that APHIS had 
ignored certain scientific information it had reviewed, reached contradictory conclusions 
on related analyses, relied on explanatory information as predictive, assumed that a lack 
of reported problems was evidence that problems had not occurred, used data 
inconsistently, failed to consider alternate options, and failed to consider interactions 
between different traits. Id.  
 
93 John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental 
Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 807, 840 (2001).  
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assessments, almost assuredly would not have run into the same difficulties 
as APHIS.94 
The concerns raised by the existing gaps in environmental review will 
be exacerbated with next-generation biotechnology developments. In 
addition to transgenic fish, the FDA, not EPA, has authority to review the 
environmental impacts of transgenic farm animals modified to produce 
human drugs.95 The EPA also lacks authority over the environmental and 
ecological impacts of transgenic insects.96 The FDA and APHIS, not the 
EPA, are the agencies that review the environmental impacts of 
pharmaceutical-producing and industrial compound-producing plants.97 As 
discussed above, whether APHIS has the capacity to conduct sufficient 
environmental reviews is questionable. For similar reasons, it is also unclear 
whether the FDA has the expertise necessary to evaluate adequately the 
environmental risks posed by biotechnology.98 The FDA is not an 
environmental agency and lacks expertise in critical areas concerning 
                                                 
 
94 Nevertheless, the EPA has been criticized for environmental scientific failures of its 
own. See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis 
in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
2167, 2211-13 (2004); see also SAP Report No. 99-06, Report: FIFRA Scientific 
Advisory Panel Meeting (2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/1999/december/report.pdf (criticizing the EPA’s 
nontarget insect data requirements for genetically modified pest-protected plants as being 
inadequate). 
95 Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. IV: Farm 
Animal (Goat) That Produces Human Drugs 7 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. IV: 
Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs], available at 
http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study5.pdf.  
 
96 Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 21. 
 
97 Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 52-53. 
 
98 Pew Initiative on Food & Biotechnology, Future Fish: Issues in Science and Regulation 
of Transgenic Fish 54-55 (2003) [hereinafter Future Fish]. 
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environmental impacts such as ecology and evolutionary biology.99 Even if 
the FDA’s environmental assessments are adequate, it is unclear whether the 
FDA possesses authority to deny certain applications on the basis of 
environmental risk.100 With new biotechnological developments fast 
approaching, it is imperative that these environmental gaps be closed. 
2. Gaps Beyond Environmental Review 
Regulatory gaps exist with respect to various agencies’ authority 
beyond the concerns raised by inadequate environmental review: 
·  Once APHIS grants a petition for 
nonregulated status for a transgenic plant, it 
no longer has any authority over the plant or 
its progeny.  For instance, APHIS is unable to 
monitor for unexpected impacts.101 
 
· There is no requirement that a 
manufacturer notify the FDA prior to the 
commercial introduction of a new genetically 
modified product.102 The FDA’s promulgation 
two years ago of a proposed regulation that 
would require notification recognized that this 
gap was a problem.103 
 
· It is unclear whether any agency has 
regulatory authority over transgenic animals 
                                                 
99 Animal Biotechnology, supra note 32, at 114-15. 
 
100 Gregory Jaffe, Coordinated Framework: Structure Needs an Overhaul, Envtl. F., 
May/June 2002, at 24. 
101 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 111, 233. In addition, if these progeny are mated 
conventionally with other nonregulated transgenic plants carrying different transgenes, 
the offspring also will be considered nonregulated, even though they will contain 
combinations of transgenes never reviewed. These combinations could have pleiotropic 
effects. Id. 
 
102 See infra Part I.B. 
 
103 See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4709-12 
(Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592) (proposed rule requiring 
premarket notification of FDA of new genetically modified products). 
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not intended for human food or to produce 
human biologics.104 
 
· EPA lacks regulatory authority over 
the growers of pest-protected plants (its 
authority only extends to the producers of 
such plants).105 
 
· Many APHIS requirements pertaining 
to preventing the environmental release of 
transgenic plants do not cover the release or 
movement of pollen.106 
 
· Some genetically modified plants are not 
regulated on the basis that their modified trait 
has been conventionally bred into plants as 
well; this decision lacks scientific justification 
as the genetic modification may cause 
different effects than those caused by 
conventional breeding.107 
 
                                                 
 
104 Case Study No. IV: Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs, supra note 95, at 14. 
It is possible that APHIS could exercise authority pursuant to the Animal Health 
Protection Act (AHPA) of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8320 (1999 & Supp. 2003), to regulate 
genetically modified animals, to the extent such animals may affect the health of livestock 
(in much the same manner as APHIS regulates genetically modified plants based on their 
plant pest threat). APHIS authority turns on the meaning of “disease” under AHPA, a 
term to be defined by the Secretary of Agriculture.  Id. § 8302(3). The Secretary may be 
able to define disease in such a manner as to include genetic modification of animals, 
although this would not be consistent with how the Secretary has defined the term 
previously, so whether such a definition would survive judicial review is not clear.  See, 
e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 319.59-1 (2004) (defining “disease” in another agricultural context to 
include “its common meaning [and] a disease agent which incites a disease”).  In 
addition, the legislative history of the AHPA is quite sparse and does not indicate that 
such a broad interpretation was intended. 
105 Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 35. 
 
106 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 109; APHIS, User’s Guide for Introducing 
Genetically Engineered Plants and Microorganisms Technical Bulletin 1783 (1997) 
[hereinafter APHIS, User’s Guide], available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/usergd.html. 
 
107 See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 86 (arguing that the failure to regulate crops 
conventionally bred to contain certain traits does not justify not regulating crops 
genetically engineered to contain the same trait).  
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· APHIS lacks the statutory authority to 
regulate genetically modified vertebrate plant 
pests and all organisms free of genetic 
material from plant pests.108 
 
A cross-agency deficiency results from agencies’ reliance on the 
developer’s planned use for their transgenic product as the trigger for 
regulation, as opposed to basing regulation on the actual characteristics of the 
product. For example, the EPA only regulates a transgenic plant under its 
pest-protected plant rules if the developer of the plant plans for it to be used 
for its pesticidal effects. Thus, the EPA does not regulate a transgenic corn 
variety modified to produce a known pesticide because the developer is 
developing the corn for purposes other than pest resistance, in this instance 
for medical diagnostic procedures (is this qualification needed?).109 
Similarly, for purposes of determining whether field-testing of a transgenic 
plant meets APHIS’s notification criteria, a modification is only considered 
to be for a pharmaceutical use if clinical testing of the product is proposed to 
the FDA.110 Thus, the developer of the product, as opposed to APHIS, 
determines whether these types of transgenic plants may be prohibited from 
notification approval. 
Other gaps exist in APHIS’ notification and permitting processes. 
APHIS regulations state that a transgenic plant is not eligible for testing or 
commercialization under the notification process if the transgenes “[e]ncode 
substances that are known or likely to be toxic to nontarget organisms.”111 
APHIS, however, defines “toxicity to nontarget species” to apply only to 
                                                 
 
108 Kunich, supra note 93, at 840. 
109 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 180. 
 
110 See APHIS, User’s Guide, supra note 106. 
 
111 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b)(4)(ii) (2003). 
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species that feed on the plant, not on dispersed plant parts, such as seeds, 
pollen, or plant residue.112 Further, allergenicity is not one of the factors 
considered in approving a notification.113 As discussed above, under the 
notification process, there is no limit to the amount of genetically modified 
product that can be planted or commercialized.114 It therefore would be 
possible under the notification process to grow vast quantities of genetically 
engineered crops that have toxic plant parts or may be allergenic.115 This 
scenario appears to have occurred in at least one instance.116  
Similarly, under APHIS’ permit process, APHIS can request 
additional information from applicants, but cannot require the requested 
information.117 This deficiency may become critical as the permit process is 
expected to be the primary route for the commercial production of 
pharmaceutical-producing plants. 
Regulatory gaps also exist with respect to the failure to properly 
inform growers regarding the proper manner for use and containment of 
genetically modified crops. This failure is a root cause of the contamination 
that occurred in the well-covered StarLink and ProdiGene genetically 
modified food contamination scares.118 Critics also have noted it as a 
                                                 
 
112 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 180-81. 
 
113 Id. at 181. 
 
114 See id. at 180-81. 
 
115 See id. at 181. 
 
116 See id. at 180-81. This instance involves transgenic corn that produces the 
glycoprotein avidin. Id. Avidin is potentially toxic to a broad array of organisms, both in 
the field and after harvest. Id. The National Research Council “questions the wisdom of 
allowing such plants to be grown under the streamlined notification system.” Id. at 182. 
 
117 Id. at 110; see also 7 C.F.R. § 340.4 (2003). 
 
118 See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2203-08, 2213-16. 
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problem with regard to the proper planting of refuge areas so as to reduce the 
incidence of pesticide resistance.119 Part of this deficiency stems from a 
failure of agencies to exercise their full regulatory authority, and part stems 
from regulators lacking authority over all entities involved in the use of 
biotechnological products. 
The numerous regulatory gaps identified above unnecessarily increase 
the risk posed by genetically modified products. In addition, they increase the 
likelihood of future high-profile transgenic product scares that could both 
reduce public trust in the regulatory system and cause public opinion to 
coalesce against transgenic products. In either case, this would prevent 
society from harvesting the optimum benefit of such products. 
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies 
The Coordinated Framework in 1986 identified two primary 
priorities: that the agencies regulating genetically modified products “adopt 
consistent definitions” of genetically modified organisms and that the 
agencies implement scientific reviews of “comparable rigor” in their 
regulation of transgenic products.120 Neither priority has been met. 
As a result of constraints created by primary reliance on statutes that 
predate the advent of biotechnology, each of the three agencies involved in 
the regulation of genetically modified products define identical regulatory 
constructs differently. Pest protected plants provide an example of a 
genetically modified product over which all three agencies have regulatory 
                                                 
 
119 Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically 
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 297, 343-46 (2002) (discussing farmers’ 
noncompliance with refuge requirements); Gregory Jaffe, Planting Trouble: Are Farmers 
Squandering Bt Corn Technology? 5-6 (2003), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/bt_corn_report.pdf (providing data on the number of 
farms out of compliance with refuge requirements in various states). 
120 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,303 (June 26, 1986). 
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authority. As Table 2 shows, each of the agencies identify the regulated 
product and define the regulated substance differently. 
Table 2. Inconsistent Agency Definitions of Pest-Protected Plants121 
 
 
 
EPA 
 
USDA 
 
FDA 
Regulated 
Product 
Plant-Incorporated 
protectant 
Plant pest, regulated 
article 
Food, feed, food 
additive 
Regulated 
Substance 
Pesticidal substance
and genetic material
necessary for its 
production 
Organism engineered 
to contain sequences 
from plant pests 
Human food 
(whole or 
processed), 
animal feed 
With respect to the second priority, the National Research Council 
has specifically noted that the data on which the EPA and APHIS base their 
analyses, and the scientific stringency with which they conduct their 
analyses, are not comparably rigorous.122 APHIS’s risk assessment model 
may, in fact, bias it toward a finding of no significant risk.123 Thus, close to 
two decades after the Coordinated Framework was established, neither of its 
priorities, both of which were aimed at consistency, have been achieved. 
Other substantial regulatory inconsistencies exist. Genetically 
engineered pest-protected crops require premarket approval if they are 
intended to be used for their pest-protection properties, in line with EPA 
regulations;124 all other genetically engineered food crops do not require 
premarket approval, including those crops modified to express a known 
                                                 
 
121 NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 159 (the table reproduced above has been modified 
to reflect changes to agency definitions since the table was originally published). The 
Coordinated Framework recognized from the outset that achieving consistent definitions 
would not always be possible because of statutory constraints. See, e.g., Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,303 (stating that as a 
result of existing law, some definitions between agencies may seem inconsistent). The 
failure to achieve this goal, therefore, is not necessarily the result of a lack of effort on the 
agencies’ part. It does, however, demonstrate the difficulty of promulgating consistent 
regulations based on statutes enacted to handle different products. 
122 See NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 170-71. 
 
123 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 98. 
 
124 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
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pesticide, so long as the developer is producing the crop for another purpose, 
as they are subject to the FDA’s voluntary consultation process.125 This 
differentiation lacks a sound basis in science, logic, or public policy. 
In another example, when APHIS granted nonregulated status to 
certain genetically modified Bt crops, it did so, on the basis that EPA 
regulations would adequately prevent Bt resistance from arising in plant 
pests.126 APHIS, however, granted nonregulated status prior to the EPA’s 
registration process, and did not follow-up to check that the EPA had 
promulgated the anticipated regulations.127 Once APHIS granted 
nonregulated status, manufacturers and growers had no obligation to track or 
keep track of the genetically modified product, thereby limiting the EPA’s 
ability to gather data and information on the impacts that APHIS expected 
the EPA to prevent through regulation in the first instance.128 
The regulatory inconsistencies identified in this section are irrational 
and introduce substantial inefficiencies and unreasonable risks into 
transgenic product regulation.129 
                                                 
 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19; see also 21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2003). 
 
126 See Bratspies, supra note 119, at 324-25. 
 
127 See id. at 325. 
128 See id. at 325-26. 
 
129 Instances in which agencies’ regulatory authority overlap, but the agencies have 
reached different conclusions regarding the regulation of transgenic products, also 
demonstrate inconsistencies. See infra Part II.D. 
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C. Regulatory Inexperience 
The StarLink corn contamination highlights both an example of an 
agency acting outside of its area of expertise and the potentially disastrous 
effects of such action. Had the EPA, or likely the FDA, been familiar with 
the nation’s agricultural system, it would have recognized that it was 
impossible for StarLink corn, unapproved for human consumption, to be kept 
fully segregated from corn used for human food.130 This lack of knowledge 
led to the most infamous transgenic food scare to date. 
The numerous instances of agencies other than the EPA bearing 
responsibility for environmental review also present situations in which 
agencies are acting outside of their areas of expertise. These examples 
include: (1) the USDA and the FDA regulating the environmental impact of 
genetically modified plants other than pest-protected ones,131 (2) the FDA 
regulating the environmental impact of transgenic fish and animals,132 and (3) 
APHIS likely regulating the environmental impact of transgenic insects.133In 
this regard, for instance, APHIS’s analysis of the likelihood of virus-resistant 
genes spreading from squash to weedy relatives has been criticized for not 
being well supported by scientific studies and lacking necessary data.134 In 
part, these deficiencies were perceived to come about as the result of 
“inadequate expertise [at APHIS] in population genetics.”135 
                                                 
  
130 See Barnaby J. Feder, Companies Act To Keep Bioengineered Corn Out of Food, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 27, 2000, at C2; Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends 
in Biotechnology Litigation, 20 Rev. Litig. 589, 614-15 (2001). 
  
131 See supra notes 25-26, 53 and accompanying text. 
 
132 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 
133 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
134 See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 134-35; NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 
122-25. 
 
135 NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 134. 
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Lack of expertise and experience has led to other problems. In 
evaluating the risk that certain genetically modified crops posed to the 
Monarch butterfly, for instance, the EPA failed to fully grasp the potential 
varied impact of transgenic products, and various assumptions made 
concerning the threat of transgenic pollen were scientifically unsound.136 
Perhaps similarly stemming from inexperience, isolation distances 
required by APHIS for test plots of transgenic crops have been criticized as 
not being scientifically justifiable.137 APHIS appears to have derived a 
required isolation distance, intended to establish a zero tolerance for 
contamination simply by doubling the isolation distance used by the USDA 
in another regulatory context in which a contamination level of 0.1% was 
acceptable.138 There was no evidence that doubling the isolation distance 
would reduce the anticipated level of contamination from 0.1% to zero.139 As 
discussed above, long distance pollen flow is poorly understood.140 Pollen 
does appear to travel at least several kilometers, many times the isolation 
distance at issue.141 Some have cited contamination by pollen flow as part of 
the cause of the StarLink fiasco.142 
                                                 
 
136 Mandel, supra note 94, at 2212-13. 
 
137 See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 125. 
 
138 See id. 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 See id., at 66-67; NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 80; Martin Teitel & Kimberly A. 
Wilson, Genetically Engineered Food: Changing the Nature of Nature 38-39 (2001). 
Organic farmers particularly are concerned about gene flow because the movement of 
genes from genetically modified plants into organic crops could render such crops non-
organic. NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 90. 
 
141 Compare 7 C.F.R. § 201.76 (2003) (stating the required isolation distances for various 
crops), with NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 91 (discussing a study which found 
pollen dispersed as far as three kilometers from its source). Currently proposed 
regulations would increase the buffer zone for corn to between a half mile and one mile, 
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These problems of regulatory inexperience and agencies acting in 
areas beyond their expertise not only result in significant inefficiencies, but 
also dramatically and unnecessarily increase the risk posed by genetically 
modified products. 
D. Regulatory Overlaps 
Several types of regulatory overlap exist in the current regulatory 
structure. The first overlap concerns situations in which different agencies 
have authority over similar issues. For example, the EPA addresses food 
safety issues associated with plants genetically modified to produce their own 
pesticide,143 whereas the FDA addresses similar food safety issues for all 
other genetically modified plants.144 There is no scientific rationale for this 
distinction. It is the result of the historical accident of transgenic pest-
protected plants falling within FIFRA’s statutory language.  
Similarly, both the EPA and APHIS conduct overlapping reviews 
regarding the impact of pest-protected plants on nontarget species. The EPA 
studied the potential impact of Bt corn on butterflies to determine the effect 
of the pesticide on nontarget species, whereas APHIS studied the potential 
impact of Bt corn on butterflies to determine whether it would lead to a 
reduced butterfly population.145 A reduced butterfly population was 
                                                                                                                         
depending on certain other factors. See supra note 72. 
 
142 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Foods, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 403, 487 (2002) (“Still others claimed that they 
had innocently sold elevators StarLink®-contaminated corn when the corn they planted 
became cross-fertilized by StarLink® corn from neighboring fields.”). 
 
143 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
 
144 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
 
145 See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 72-74; Council on Envtl. Quality & Office of 
Sci. & Tech. Policy, Case Study No. II: Bt-Maize 32 (2001) [hereinafter Case Study No. 
II: Bt-Maize], available at http://www.ostp.gov/ html/ceq_ostp_study3.pdf (presenting an 
example of overlap between the EPA and APHIS); NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 
163-65 (concluding that there is substantial overlap in this area); see also Regulations 
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considered a potential plant pest risk as it could allow greater growth of 
weeds that the butterflies feed on.146 In each instance, the result is that 
regulatory expertise and effort is inefficiently duplicated in multiple 
agencies. 
A second type of regulatory overlap occurs where multiple agencies 
request the same information about the same biotechnological product, but do 
not share the information. For instance, though APHIS reviews genetically 
modified herbicide-tolerant plants and the EPA reviews the herbicide that 
will be applied, these reviews are not coordinated.147  
The worst case scenario for overlaps is for agencies to reach different 
conclusions concerning the same product. Such a result has occurred. Both 
APHIS and the EPA reviewed the potential for transgenic cotton to cross 
with wild cotton in parts of the United States. APHIS concluded that “[n]one 
of the relatives of cotton found in the United States ... show any definite 
weedy tendencies.”148 EPA, conversely, found that there would be a risk of 
transgenic cotton crossing with species of wild cotton in southern Florida, 
southern Arizona, and Hawaii.149 
                                                                                                                         
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated 
Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,775 (July 19, 2001) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (recognizing the potential for duplicative regulation 
in this area). In certain instances, it has been unclear whether APHIS was acting 
independently of the EPA, possibly producing differing levels of regulatory scrutiny, or 
whether APHIS lacked requisite expertise and was relying on the EPA’s determinations. 
See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 157. 
 
146 See NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 72. 
 
147 See Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 17-18 (stating 
that although APHIS and the EPA are working on coordinating efforts, currently, there 
are no formal exchanges between the two agencies on this subject). 
 
148 John H. Payne, USDA / APHIS Petition 97-013-01p for Determination of 
Nonregulated Status for Events 31807 and 31808 Cotton: Environmental Assessment and 
Finding of No Significant Impact (1997), available at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/dec_docs/9701301p_ea.HTM. 
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Regulatory overlap in the area of genetically modified products has 
led to inefficient duplicative expertise and review as well as to conflicting 
conclusions. 
 
III.  CURING REGULATORY DEFICIENCIES 
 
The deficiencies identified above point directly to many of the 
solutions that must be implemented in a new statutory and regulatory 
structure for regulating genetically modified products. These solutions fall 
into two broad categories: closing regulatory and statutory gaps, and 
overhauling the division of regulatory responsibility. 
A. Closing Regulatory and Statutory Gaps 
Numerous statutory and regulatory gaps must be closed to provide an 
adequate regulatory structure for genetically modified products. The most 
critical gaps exist with respect to environmental protection and next-
generation biotechnology.150 The EPA should be given statutory authority to 
evaluate the environmental risk posed by genetically modified products, with 
respect to transgenic fish because of the risk that escaped fish pose to native 
populations.151 Transgenic insects similarly pose environmental concerns.152 
Although the environmental risk posed by livestock is lower because of the 
reduced risk of escape,153 the EPA still should have authority over all 
genetically modified animals. The EPA also should be able to consider the 
                                                                                                                         
149 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Bt Plant-Pesticides Biopesticides Registration Action 
Document IIC9-IIC10 (2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2000/october/brad3_enviroassessment.pdf. 
 
150 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 
151 See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2208-11. 
  
152 See id., at 2201. 
153 See supra note 95. 
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environmental impact of transgenic plants other than those modified to be 
pest protected because of the risks of gene flow and invasiveness.154 
Currently APHIS’ review of releases, which focuses on impacts to 
agriculture, is the only review of the environmental  impact of these plants. 
The vast majority of this review consists of the notification process.155 
Expanded EPA environmental review does not mean that industry 
expenses will significantly increase, which could slow or otherwise impede 
biotechnology growth. First, EPA review will likely indicate that many types 
of transgenic products are not significant environmental threats and can be 
handled through some sort of notification process.156 It should be the EPA 
that makes this environmental determination, not an agency that lacks 
environmental expertise or resources. Second, for products of greater 
concern, EPA expertise should allow it to reach final determinations faster 
and more predictably than the current arrangement, with concomitant 
benefits for biotechnology developers. 
The second major gap area, concerning next-generation 
biotechnology, also must be addressed. Regulations governing genetically 
modified animals for uses other than as human food or to produce human 
biologics must be encouraged. This is particularly important, as several 
animals modified to produce animal or veterinary biological products are 
anticipated in the near future.157 As discussed above, the AHPA may provide 
                                                 
 
154 Examples of these types of plants would include, for example, pharmaceutical-
producing, industrial compound-producing, herbicide-tolerant, drought-tolerant, salinity-
tolerant, virus-resistant, temperature-tolerant, and disease-resistant plants. 
 
155 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. 
 
156 See, e.g., NRC 2002 Report, supra note 6, at 83 (stating that most genetic 
introductions will not pose a threat to the environment). 
 
157 See Case Study No. IV: Farm Animal That Produces Human Drugs, supra note 95, at 
14. 
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APHIS with a basis for regulatory authority over such transgenic animals, but 
such authority is both unclear and has not been asserted.158 Similarly, 
statutory authority for and regulations governing the research and 
commercialization of transgenic insects also needs to be developed. The lack 
of a clear regulatory structure in these next-generation areas may impede 
scientific progress. 
Additional regulatory gaps must be filled within each of the three 
agencies. All agencies should regulate based on the potential risks of a given 
product, not based on how a developer classifies the product. APHIS should 
be given authority to monitor transgenic plants after they have been granted 
nonregulated status to provide for postmarket monitoring or oversight in 
order to be able to detect and correct any unanticipated problems.159 
The FDA should implement its 2001 proposed regulations to make 
notification of the commercialization of new genetically modified food 
products mandatory. Though the FDA believes it has been voluntarily 
notified of all such products introduced to date,160 as the role of 
biotechnology expands, not all developers will necessarily take this step. 
Absent knowledge of a particular genetic modification, the FDA has no 
method for monitoring whether food products have been genetically modified 
or contain any genetically modified component.161 
Growers of genetically modified pest-protected plants should be made 
accountable to the EPA for the manner of use and containment of the 
                                                 
 
158 See supra note 74. 
 
159 See Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 44 (stating that the need for postmarket oversight 
is likely to change with genetic products). 
 
160 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
161 See Taylor & Tick, supra note 51, at 54 (stating that agencies today only respond to 
specific safety concerns that arise, rather than knowing which products are genetically 
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transgenic plants. Currently, only product developers are accountable to the 
EPA, and grower accountability is attempted through contractual agreements 
between the producer and the grower required by the EPA.162 The 
contamination in the StarLink163 and ProdiGene164 cases, as well as recent 
surveys of grower compliance,165 demonstrate that such informal control is 
not sufficient. 
Most of the other statutory and regulatory gaps identified above have 
clear fixes and will not be discussed further.166 A final point with respect to 
regulatory gaps should be made. Some gaps are not the result of statutory or 
regulatory deficiencies but result in part from a lack of scientific knowledge. 
Long-distance pollen flow is a prime example. It is a poorly understood 
phenomenon, but it has a significant effect on how numerous genetically 
modified crops and pharmaceutical-producing and industrial compound-
producing plants should be handled. One solution in these instances is to 
create a market for the missing scientific data. If, for instance, agencies began 
to require data on pollen flow in relation to regulatory approval for planting 
transgenic plants under certain conditions, understanding of this critical 
parameter would improve rapidly.167 Improved scientific understanding will 
                                                                                                                         
modified). 
162 See id. at 34-36. The grower is therefore under no legal obligation to the EPA to 
comply with any planting restrictions. See id. 
 
163 See Mandel, supra note 94, at 2203-08. 
 
164 See id. at 2213-16. 
 
165 Jaffe, supra note 119, at 5-6 (presenting data on refuge requirement compliance 
deficiencies on corn farms). 
 
166 See supra Part II.A. 
 
167 For example, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) liability and potential liability created a market for data on groundwater 
chemistry and hydrology. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 Ecology 
L.Q. 887, 898 (1997) (reviewing Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural 
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allow for more finely tuned regulation, which in turn will result in savings for 
industry as it will not have to comply with regulations that are inefficiently 
overprotective due to a lack of information. 
B. Overhauling the Division of Regulatory Responsibility 
In order to maximize the social welfare improvements provided by 
genetically modified products, instances of regulatory agencies acting outside 
of their areas of expertise, regulatory overlap, and inconsistent and 
sometimes conflicting regulation must be remedied. All three of these 
problems can be substantially ameliorated by shifting the division of 
regulatory authority over genetically modified products from the current one, 
based haphazardly on preexisting statutes, to a division based upon each 
agency’s expertise and general mandate. Thus, the FDA should bear 
responsibility for the human health risks posed by genetically modified plants 
or animals intended for use as human food or pharmaceuticals; the EPA 
should take responsibility for evaluating the environmental risks posed by 
transgenic products; and the USDA should regulate the impact of genetically 
engineered products on agricultural crops and livestock. 
This division of regulatory authority not only is inherently logical, but 
provides the added benefits of increased efficiency, greater human health and 
environmental protection, and economic savings. Placing regulatory 
authority for particular risks in the hands of the agency with the most 
expertise, experience, and relevant resources will best guarantee that the risk 
                                                                                                                         
Ecosystems (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)). Wetlands regulations created a market for 
data on wetlands vegetation and hydrology. Id. Both of these needs led to a much better 
understanding of the respective scientific issues. 
 Requiring industry to provide scientific information raises concerns about 
potential industry bias in the reporting of data. The experience with hazardous and toxic 
waste site clean-up, wetlands protection, endangered species surveys, and other types of 
environmental assessment requirements has demonstrated that regulatory agency review 
of industry-provided data can help to ensure accuracy and lead to greater scientific 
knowledge in the long run. See id. (discussing the improvement in the understanding of 
scientific matters due to CERCLA and wetlands regulation). 
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is properly evaluated and protected against. It will do so as quickly and 
inexpensively as possible. Such action also will clear up instances of 
regulatory inconsistency and overlap because a given risk will only be 
evaluated by a single agency.  
One concern with such a solution may be that a single transgenic 
product could be regulated by multiple agencies if it presents multiple types 
of risks; that is, there will be certain types of overlap even under the 
proposed changes to the regulatory system. Because genetically modified 
products raise varied types of risk, it is inevitable that there will be some 
overlap in agency responsibility under any regulatory system. The nature of 
legislation and regulation themselves necessarily create overlaps and gaps, as 
well as over-regulation and under-regulation. Legislation and regulation 
require the categorization of problems or concerns in some manner. 
Inevitably certain issues will arise that do not fit neatly into the regulatory 
boxes created. Where these issues fall through the cracks, there will be a 
regulatory gap; where they fall within multiple boxes, there will be 
regulatory overlap. For efficiency and economic purposes, one goal of 
regulation should be to minimize these regulatory problems, while still 
maintaining adequate protection. The proposals provided here seek to 
minimize regulatory gaps and greatly reduce the existing amount of 
regulatory overlap. 
In addition, the expense of any overlap that results from this proposal 
can be reduced by requiring the agencies to coordinate their actions; for 
instance, by designating a lead agency based on the most significant risk and 
requiring only a single developer submission covering all pertinent 
information for a given product. Under the existing regulatory system, a lead 
agency is usually, but not always, designated for transgenic products that fall 
within multiple agencies’ authority. Such designation, however, is not 
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necessarily based on the type of risk presented and generally has not resulted 
in coordinated information submission requirements.168 For instance, both the 
EPA and the USDA require similar information submissions on pest-
protected plants.  
The requirements proposed here also would force better 
communication among the various agencies, a problem that has plagued 
biotechnology regulation since its inception,169 with increased efficiency for 
industry and savings for taxpayers. Most importantly, placing responsibility 
for a given risk with the agency best equipped to regulate it removes the cost 
of paying for unnecessary duplicative areas of expertise in multiple agencies, 
significantly reducing the expense of regulation. 
It is worth noting that in most areas of regulation in the United States, 
the agency that has regulatory authority over a given product is usually the 
agency with the most expertise in handling the type of risk presented by the 
product. Genetically modified product regulation, however, is a product of 
the historical accident of transgenic products being squeezed into statutory 
definitions not intended for them. Shifting regulatory authority to a risk-
based approach will eradicate numerous inefficiencies and minimize risks to 
consumers and society.  
 
168 See Wilson Huhn, Three Legal Frameworks for Regulating Genetic Technology, 19 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y, 1, 29 (2002) (“Despite its name, the [Coordinated 
Framework] has often lacked coordination.”). 
 
169 See, e.g., Recommendations and Statement of the Administrative Conference 
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,493 (Dec. 29, 1989) 
(recommending numerous steps to improve interagency coordination in the regulation of 
biotechnology); Case Study No. III: Herbicide-Tolerant Soybean, supra note 63, at 17-18 
(noting that the EPA and APHIS have not coordinated herbicide-tolerant plant review); 
NRC 2000 Report, supra note 4, at 16 (recommending improving interagency 
coordination in the regulation of biotechnology). 
